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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite persistent constitutional questions, United States
administrative agencies have grown in influence during this century.'
Much of this controversy has centered around Congress's ability to
control the removal of administrative officials constitutionally. In an
effort to retain control of administrative agencies and in recognition of
the need to conduct certain adjudicative functions outside the execu-
tive's domain, Congress has sought to create some agencies free from
presidential influence. In particular, Congress has focused on at-
tempting to limit the President's power to remove administrative
officials. Although such limitations have always been controversial, 2
the Supreme Court is generally thought to have resolved this particu-
lar constitutional issue: while Congress itself may not control the re-
moval of a government official performing executive duties, 3 Congress
may limit the President's power to remove.4 Congress has therefore
won the constitutional battle to establish its power to limit the
President's removal authority. The essential question now is how this
victory affects the larger struggle to create agencies independent of
presidential control. How much legal protection has Congress actu-
ally secured for government agency heads, and what legal rights vest
in these officials as a result?
Congress has sought to limit the President's removal power,
and thereby insulate some administrative activities from direct presi-
dential control,s by including "for-cause" removal provisions in the
enabling statutes of certain administrative agencies. Such clauses
allow the President to remove officers only "for cause," and they typi-
cally limit "cause" to "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
1. William H. Hardie III, Note, The Independent Agency After Bowsher v. Synar-Aiive
and Kicking, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 903, 904 (1987).
2. This controversy is evident in the many cases challenging Congress's ability to limit
the President's removal authority. See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926);
Hunphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.
349 (1958); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
3. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding Congress's retention of veto
power over removals unconstitutional); Myers, 272 U.S. at 176 (finding unconstitutional a
requirement of senatorial consent to the removal of a postmaster).
4. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694-97 (allowing limitation of the President's power to
remove an Independent Counsel); Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356 (inferring for-cause requirements for
the removal of War Claims Commissioners); Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629-32
(upholding for-cause requirements for the removal of Federal Trade Commissioners).
5. Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers:
The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 627, 657 n. 169 (1989).
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office."6  Theoretically, this limitation, along with other measures
enacted by Congress,7 frees an agency head from the need to defer to
presidential opinion,8 creating a "body which shall be independent of
executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its
judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official. . .."9
The effectiveness of for-cause removal provisions in accomplishing
this goal, however, remains unclear.1° Because a president's assertion
of cause has never been challenged in court,11 the legal extent of this
independence has never been tested. Thus, it is unclear what remedy,
if any, would be available to an agency head who was discharged
without proper cause. Such an agency head would likely seek redress
in the courts, requesting either money damages or reinstatement.
This Note explores the extent to which each of these remedies is
either unavailable or ineffective in accomplishing Congress's goal of
creating independence.
After examining the historical development of limitations on
the President's removal power, 12 this Note explores possible remedies
available to an improperly discharged agency head. Typical remedies
6. An Act to Create a Federal Trade Commission, Pub. L. No. 203, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717
(Sept. 26, 1914), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994 ed.) (Federal Trade Commission enabling
statute). Although the extent of "cause" has never been definitively determined, at the very
least it requires a statement of the President's reason for discharge. In contrast, other
administrative officers are understood to serve at the will of the President.
7. Congress also typically attempts to further the insularity of these agencies by
organizing them around multi-member bipartisan commissions rather than a single agency
head. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Debate Over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical Evidence,
1988 Duke L. J. 215, 216 n.5.
8. Sidney A. Shapiro and Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L. J. 819, 849 n. 134 (citing Study on
Federal Regulation, vol. 5, S. Doc. No. 91, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 28-43 (1977)).
9. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 625-26.
10. See Emmette S. Redford, The President and the Regulatory Commissions, 44 Tex. L.
Rev. 288, 311 (1965) (arguing that the lack of presidential authority in these agencies dimin-
ishes policy coordination by the President). For the opposing view, see Angel Manuel Moreno,
Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 461
(1994) (describing methods of presidential control over the regulatory process in independent
agencies); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943 (1980) (describing the role of the President in coordinating agency
policy).
11. In the two major removal cases, Myers v. United States and Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, the officials were not jemoved for a stated cause, nor did they seek
reinstatement. In the recent case of Swan v. Clinton, 932 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal
docketed, No. 96-5193 (D.C. Cir. June 25, 1996) a removed member of the National Credit Union
Administration ("NCUA") Board did seek reinstatement; however, President Clinton did not
assert any cause for the discharge. Instead, Clinton asserted that there is no for-cause provision
applicable to the NCUA.
12. See Part II.
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for unlawful removals are money damages and equitable relief.'3 Part
III concludes that because an award of money damages would not
effectively constrain the President, it would not accomplish Congress's
goal of assuring agency heads that they will remain in their positions.
Part IV then examines the constitutionality of the equitable remedy of
reinstatement, exploring the difficulties posed by the Appointments
Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. Part V then con-
fronts the separate barriers presidential immunity and justiciability
pose to reinstatement. Finally, Part VI considers equitable concerns
relevant to the granting of reinstatement. All of these considerations
suggest that a court either could not or would not reinstate an agency
head.
This Note therefore concludes that money damages are ineffec-
tive and reinstatement is not available as a remedy for the invalid
removal of an independent agency head. Consequently, the for-cause
provisions in independent agencies' enabling statutes offer no practi-
cal, legal source of independence. More broadly, this absence of legal
rights vesting in independent agency heads calls into question the
efficacy of Congress's attempts to use for-cause provisions to insulate
certain agencies from presidential control.' 4
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S
REMOVAL POWER
In 1887, Congress created the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("ICC"), the first independent regulatory commission and
subjected the President's control over ICC commissioners to a for-
cause removal provision.15 While Congress set up several other agen-
cies in the same manner over the next few decades, their constitu-
tionality was not questioned until the New Deal era.16
13. Equitable relief includes reinstatement and declaratory relief. Dan B. Dobbs, Law of
Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution § 6.10(5) (West, 2d ed. 1993). Declaratory relief
consists of an "authoritative declaration of the parties' disputed rights." Id. § 2.1(2) at 60. Such
relief is arguably available to discharged agency heads. This Note will only discuss the possibil-
ity of reinstatement, however, because much of the same equitable discretion involved in an
order of reinstatement is also involved in an order of declaratory relief. Id. § 6.10(4).
14. As one scholar stated, "if independent agencies are not protected from unlimited
removal by the Executive, the agencies' independence would be a sham." Hardie, 40 Vand. L.
Rev. at 909 (cited in note 1).
15. Rosenberg, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 657-58 (cited in note 5) (describing the creation of
the ICC and the relationship between the independence of the executive and tenure).
16. Id.
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The Supreme Court first addressed a constitutional challenge
to constraints on the President's removal power in Myers v. United
States.17 Pursuant to statute, the United States Postmaster General
was appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate and removable only with senatorial consent.'8 In 1920,
President Woodrow Wilson dismissed the Postmaster General without
consulting the Senate. In upholding the removal, the Court held that
any reservation of congressional control over the removal of an ex-
ecutive officer violated the separation of powers doctrine. 9 The Court
explained that removal power was incident to appointment power.
Thus, officers for whom the Constitution requires presidential ap-
pointment2" are subject to removal at the pleasure of the President.2'
Soon, however, in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,22 the
Supreme Court limited the Myers holding. The Court's opinion in
Humphrey's Executor framed the debate over for-cause removals for
the remainder of this century. Relying on the authority apparently
recognized in Myers, President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to
remove William E. Humphrey, a member of the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), without stating cause as required by statute.
Commissioner Humphrey passed away, and his executor sued for
back pay claiming that the removal was invalid.2 3 The President ar-
gued that, under Myers, the for-cause provision was an unconstitu-
tional interference with his executive function.24 The Court rejected
this argument and limited the holding in Myers to "purely executive"
officers. 25 The Court classified the functions of the FTC as quasi-judi-
cial and quasi-legislative rather than purely executive, and thereby
found that the need for independence of agencies performing such
functions outweighed the President's concerns regarding interference
17. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
18. Id. at 107.
19. Id. at 176.
20. Under Article II, § 2, cl. 2 (the "Appointments Clause"), the President shall "nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States... "' The Court has interpreted this to mean that all "Principal Officers" of the United
States must be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976).
21. Myers, 272 U.S. at 122.
22. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
23. Id. at 618-19.
24. Id. at 617.
25. Id. at 628. Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v.
Synar, 1986 Duke L. J. 779, 783 (noting that the Court drew an "imaginary line" in
distinguishing Myers from Humphrey's Executor).
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with the executive function.26 Because the agency's functions were not
purely executive, removing these functions from executive control did
not interfere with presidential duties.27
Presidential authority to remove executive officers was further
restricted in Wiener v. United States.28 In Wiener, the Court applied a
for-cause removal requirement to members of the War Claims
Commission despite the lack of such a provision in the enabling stat-
ute. 29  Citing Humphrey's Executor, the Court stated that the
Commission's functions were largely quasi-judicial, and consequently
Congress must have intended to protect the Commissioners from
presidential control. 30  Thus the Court not only reaffirmed
Humphrey's Executor, but also expanded the possible bases for finding
such limitations on the President's removal power.
Despite the Court's apparent determination to preserve
Congress's power of limitation,31 the executive continued to challenge
for-cause removal provisions.3 2 The Court effectively ended the de-
bate, however, in Morrison v. Olson33 In Morrison the Court heard a
constitutional challenge to the Independent Counsel provision of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 34  Under that statute, the
26. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628.
27. Id. at 629.
28. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
29. Id. at 355-56.
30. Id. Because of the adjudicative nature of the Commission's activities, the Court felt it
should operate outside the executive's domain. This decision contradicted the opinion of at least
one lower court. In Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 28 F. Supp. 732, 737 (E.D. Tenn.
1939), the court read Humphrey's Executor to allow removal for cause only when Congress has
explicitly expressed its intent to so limit the President's inherent power of removal.
31. The Court has made specific references demonstrating this intent, even in cases where
it has ultimately adopted a rigid view of the separation of powers. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 725 n.4 (1986) (expressly stating that the Court had no intent to cast doubt on the
constitutionality of independent agencies).
32. Throughout the 1980s, the Reagan administration launched a series of challenges to
the constitutionality of independent agencies in an attempt to increase the power of the
executive. Lower courts consistently refuted these challenges. See FTC v. American Nat'l
Cellular, Inc., 810 F.2d 1511, 1514 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding the prosecutorial function of the
FTC, even though prosecution is an executive function); FTC v. Engage-A-Car Service, No. 86-
3758, slip op. (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 1986) (denying a claim that the FTC's enforcement is un-
constitutional); Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 740-42 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing
to hear a challenge to the for-cause provision in the FTC statute); Hospital Corp. of America v.
FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1392-93 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a challenge to the FTC was not prop-
erly briefed). For a thorough discussion of the Reagan administration's attempts to establish a
unitary, powerful executive, see Rosenberg, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 627 (cited in note 5).
33. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
34. Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (1978). This Act allowed the ap-
pointment of an Independent Counsel to investigate and prosecute government officials for
wrongdoing.
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Independent Counsel is appointed by the Special Division 35 and re-
movable for cause by the Attorney General. 36 The executive chal-
lenged this provision, arguing that the Independent Counsel, as a
prosecutor, was a purely executive officer. As such, the Independent
Counsel should be subject to appointment and at-will removal by the
PresidentY3 The Court rejected the argument and reconceptualized
the decision in Humphrey's Executor. The Court found that the
President's ability to remove a purely executive officer could be condi-
tioned, so long as the restrictions did not "impede the President's
ability to perform his constitutional duty."38 Under this standard, the
Court determined that the restrictions on removal of the Independent
Counsel did not unduly interfere with the President's executive func-
tions or his duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 9
With the decision in Morrison, Congress won its long constitutional
battle-its ability to limit the President's removal power over execu-
tive officials now seemed to be entrenched. The legal significance of
this victory, however, is questionable.40
In theory, one who has the power to remove has the power to
control.41 Thus, in order to free independent agency heads from presi-
dential control, Congress has sought to limit the President's removal
power with for-cause provisions. Theoretically, if the officers them-
selves no longer fear for their jobs, the President's opinion will carry
35. The Special Division consists of three federal judges temporarily assigned to the
tribunal. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 661 n.3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 49).
36. The Special Division also had removal power if the Independent Counsel had com-
pleted his or her task. Id. at 664 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2)).
37. Id. at 688-89. The argument was premised upon the holdings in Myers, 272 U.S. at 52,
and Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1. In Buckley, the validity of the Federal Elections Commission was
challenged. 424 U.S. at 109. The commission consisted of six members: two appointed by the
President, two by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and two by the Speaker of the
House. All six commissioners were to be confirmed by a majority vote of both houses. Because
officers of the United States can only be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause,
the Court found these appointment provisions to be unconstitutional. The omission of Congress
from the Constitution's list of institutions given power to appoint inferior officers prohibited
Congress from appointing the Commissioners. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126-27.
Thus, the argument in Morrison was that as an officer of the United States, the
Independent Counsel must be appointed within the confines of the Appointments Clause. The
Morrison Court got around the appointments clause problem posed in Buckley by finding the
Independent Counsel to be an inferior officer whose appointment Congress could thus vest in
courts of law. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
38. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691. For a thorough discussion of the separation of powers
issues in this case, see Janene M. Marasciullo, Removability and the Rule of Law: The
Independence of the Solicitor General, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 750, 755-58 (1989).
39. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-92.
40. Jonathan Entin has argued that because removal has little value as a political control,
the long debate over removal power has been futile. Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers,
the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 Ohio St. L. J. 175, 200 (1990).
41. Marasciullo, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 753 (cited in note 38).
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less weight. This theory falls apart, however, if there is no mecha-
nism for preventing the President from violating for-cause provisions.
Such a mechanism can only be provided by effective enforcement of
the for-cause requirement. In other words, if courts are unable to
provide an effective remedy for violations of such provisions, this calls
into question their effectiveness. The typical remedies for unlawful
removal are money damages and equitable relief in the form of rein-
statement.42 The following sections will survey these possible reme-
dies, concluding that even if a court granted judicial review of a re-
moval for cause,43 it could not constitutionally provide a satisfactory
remedy.
III. THE INEFFICACY OF MONEY DAMAGES
Money damages are typically available to government employ-
ees whose treatment violates a statutory provision. The Civil Service
Reform Act of 197844 provides an administrative and judicial scheme
for addressing employment-related disputes involving federal employ-
ees. One form of relief under this scheme is the award of back pay,
typically given when a federal employee receives unjustified discipline
resulting in the loss of compensation. 45 Although the head of an inde-
pendent agency is not covered by the Civil Service Act, a court would
likely find the same monetary remedies to be available for an unjusti-
fied removal under the Tucker Act.46
42. Dobbs, 2 Law of Remedies § 6.10(4) at 207-08 (cited in note 13).
43. This question itself is unresolved. For a presentation of the strong argument for
allowing judicial review, see Verkuil, 1986 Duke L. J. at 795-796 (cited in note 25). See also
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (establishing the authority of federal courts to review the
claim of a discharged employee that the agency causing the discharge did not follow admin-
istrative regulations); Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1985);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 317-
318 (1903); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 426 (1901) (all three establishing the right of
an executive officer to seek judicial review of his removal). But see White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366,
377 (1898) (holding that "a court of equity will not, by injunction, restrain an executive officer
from making a wrongful removal of a subordinate appointee") (quoting Morgan v. Nunn, 84 F.
Supp. 551, 553 (M.D. Tenn. 1898)).
44. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
45. The Back Pay Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) (1994), has been held to "authorize
retroactive recovery of wages whenever a federal employee has undergone an unjustified or
unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of
the compensation to which the employee is otherwise entitled." United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 405 (1976). See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385 n.25 (1983) (describing the Back
Pay Act as extending back pay as a remedy to certain categories of employees affected by
personnel actions which are found to be unjustified).
46. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994 ed.), gives the United States Claims Court
jurisdiction to adjudicate any claim (1) founded either on the Constitution, an Act of Congress,
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The purpose of providing money damages is to compensate
plaintiffs for legally recognized losses.47 Indeed, it has been suggested
that the provision of monetary relief is, or at least can be, as effective
a remedy for wrongful discharge as any other remedy4 8 This is
because the monetary relief serves to place plaintiffs in the same
positions they were in before the unlawful behavior.
An award of money damages would indeed compensate a for-
mer agency head for any back pay or damages resulting from a re-
moval for improper cause. But a court's remedy for the improper
removal of an agency head should also serve a second pur-
pose-deterrence. 49  In the case of for-cause provisions Congress
intended to prevent the President from influencing agency policy by
threatening to terminate agency heads. Any remedy provided to a
discharged agency head would therefore have to punish the President
for becoming involved and deter such involvement in the future. An
award of money damages to an agency head removed for invalid cause.
would not serve this second objective.
The President is individually immune from damages based
upon his or her presidential duties, and would therefore not be re-
sponsible for the payment of any judgment. Such immunity was
found to exist even for a former president in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.50 In
Nixon, a former Air Force employee sued the President, charging that
the President had unlawfully removed him in retaliation for his prior
congressional testimony.51 The Court found that the President was
immune from any personal liability based upon his official acts, ex-
plaining that immunity is required by the unique nature of the
President's office and by the notion of the separation of powers.52
any regulation of an executive agency, or any express or implied contract with the government;
or (2) seeking liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. Jon Craig, ed.,
1 Civil Actions Against the United States: Its Agencies, Officers, and Employees § 1.16 at 37-38
(McGraw-Hill, 2d ed. 1992). The plaintiffs in both Myers and Humphrey's Executor brought
actions for monetary damages against the United States for their dismissals in the Court of
Claims. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 106 (describing the claim brought against the government);
Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 618 (same).
47. Dobbs, 1 Law of Remedies § 3.1 at 281 (cited in note 13).
48. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 75 (1974) (suggesting that monetary relief would
be as satisfactory a resolution as a preliminary injunction). See generally Robert Belton,
Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law (John Wiley & Sons, 1992).
49. Courts frequently use money damages to serve such a deterrent function in other
areas of the law. Dobbs, 1 Law of Remedies § 3.1 at 282 (cited in note 13).
50. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
51. Id. at 733-40.
52. Id. at 744-58. It is interesting to note, however, that the Court reserved judgment on
whether immunity would exist if Congress expressly created an action for damages against the
President. Id. at 748 n.27.
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Thus the President could not be held individually liable for any
dismissal for improper cause. Any judgment entered against a
President in his or her official capacity is paid by the government
from treasury funds. 53 The President, therefore, faces neither per-
sonal liability nor monetary loss, and any judgment would not serve
as a financial disincentive to any future removals. If a judgment does
not deter the President from removing agency heads in the future,
then it fails to accomplish Congress's goal of insulating agency heads
from the policy concerns of the President.
The "independence" of agencies is premised upon the elimina-
tion of the risk that the President will fire an agency head over a
policy disagreement. 54  If the only consequence to the President of
such a removal is an award of money damages, the President is not
deterred from removing such agency heads and the for-cause provi-
sion necessarily falls short of providing independence for the agency.55
Regardless of the monetary compensation received, the decision-
maker would still face the possibility of being removed if he or she
ignored presidential desires.56 As a result, the President's policy
agenda would still play a part in the decisionmaking process, and the
for-cause provision would not achieve the desired independence.
Accordingly, money damages fail to accomplish the goal of deterrence
and thereby fail to effectuate the congressional purpose of limiting
presidential control over certain agency functions.
53. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994 ed.) (establishing the "Judgment Fund," which is a permanent
appropriation for the payment of judgments against the United States). See also Gregory C.
Sisk, Interim Attorney's Fees Awards Against the Federal Government, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 117, 120-
25 (1989) (discussing the requirements for payment of awards from the Judgment Fund).
54. This premise itself is questionable because the extent of what constitutes cause has
never been fully determined. Verkuil, 80 Colum. L. Rev. at 955 n. 73 (cited in note 10). Some
have argued that policy incompatibility could constitute proper cause for removal. See generally
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 615-16 (1984).
55. Backpay was the remedy sought in both Humphrey's Executor and Wiener. Verkuil, 80
Colum. L. Rev. at 955 n.72 (cited in note 10). These cases, however, do not address the efficacy
of such an award (or for-cause provisions), just their constitutionality.
56. The possibility of a judgment entered against the President may, however, be a politi-
cal disincentive.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES WITH REINSTATEMENT
Unlike money damages, the remedy of reinstatement would
serve the deterrent function envisioned by Congress. By allowing
courts to restore agency heads removed for improper cause to their
previous positions, this remedy would assure such officials that policy
decisions would not place their jobs in jeopardy. Although rein-
statement would effectuate Congress's purpose, it is unlikely that this
remedy is available to discharged agency heads. Some commentators
have assumed the availability of reinstatement because this remedy is
generally available to federal employees. 57 This assumption, however,
fails to consider the inevitable constitutional difficulties posed by
court-ordered reinstatements. Such a reinstatement would violate
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Appointments Clause and would also
likely violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
A. The Appointments Clause
As noted above,58 Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution states that:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law; but the Congress may vest by Law the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 59
The text of this clause dictates that principal officers of the United
States be appointed not by courts but by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.
Any interpretation of the Appointments Clause in the context
of reinstating an agency head must therefore rely on the basic notions
of separation of powers and checks and balances that underlie the
Constitution. In drafting the Constitution, the Framers generally
remained true to Montesquieu's maxim that the legislative, executive,
and judicial departments ought to remain separate and distinct.60
57. See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 250 n.20
(Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988).
58. See note 20.
59. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, c. 2.
60. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 120. Montesquieu based this theory on concerns that
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Yet, in our constitutional design the three branches of government are
not completely separate. Although the Framers believed that the
basic realm of control of each branch should be jealously guarded,
they recognized that complete separation would render the govern-
ment unworkable. 61
In order to provide a viable governmental scheme, the Framers
created a system of checks and balances to act as a safeguard on the
powers of each branch.62 The Appointments Clause is one example of
this system. In devising a method to ensure the quality of appointees,
the Framers saw risks both in granting exclusive appointment
authority to the executive and in conferring this power solely to the
legislature." Consequently, the Appointments Clause prevents legis-
lative corruption by giving the power of appointment to the executive,
and it imposes checks on any wrongdoing by the President by requir-
ing senatorial approval. This scheme also provides accountability in
appointment by making the President responsible for the initial
choice of each officer.64 The Appointments Clause therefore maintains
[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or
body. ... there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical
manner .... Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be the legislator.
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an
oppressor.
Id. at 120 (emphasis omitted) (citing Federalist No. 47 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The
Federalist Papers 303 (Mentor, 1961)).
61. Id. at 121-22.
62. Id. at 122.
63. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 183-85 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). The
danger in both of these schemes lies in the possibility of corruption. The executive branch could
consolidate its power or facilitate reelection by appointing friends or allies. The legislature
would have not only the power to fill existing positions, but also the power to create new offices
in which to instate its allies. Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 904
(1991) (Scalia, J. concurring).
64. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 186 (Souter, J., concurring). Jurists and commentators have
articulated other views of the purpose behind the Appointments Clause. One view, expressed by
the majority in Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884, is the desire to retain the appointment power in the
hands of a few politically accountable actors. Another view is that the Appointments Clause is
meant solely as a limitation on Congress. Id. at 904 (Scalia, J., concurring). A final theory is
that the Appointments Clause was a compromise between those who wanted the appointments
power vested in Congress and those who desired that the power be given to the President in
that both the executive and the legislature participate in the appointment process. Alexander I.
Tachmes, Comment, Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. A
Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine or an Essential Check on Executive Power?, 42 U.
Miami L. Rev. 735, 746 (1988). These views lead to the conclusion that court appointment of an
agency head would be contrary to the Framers' goals. Although court appointment would
eliminate Congress from the appointment process, two additional concerns remain: A court is
not politically accountable, and court appointment would not logically serve as the same type of
compromise between vesting the appointment power in the President or in Congress.
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the separation of the governmental branches yet allows for some
commingling to ensure accountability.65 The preservation of these
benefits requires an assurance that no branch will aggrandize its
appointment power or abdicate its role.66 This analysis, coupled with
the text of the Appointments Clause, demonstrates that if a court did
attempt to reinstate a dismissed agency head, it would effectively
usurp the President's prerogative to choose principal government
officers.67
The Supreme Court's separation of powers cases involving the
power of the President are somewhat disjointed.68 In some cases, the
Court has adopted a formalist approach and maintained a strict sepa-
ration between the branches. 69 In other cases, however, the Court has
taken a more functional approach and allowed some commingling of
governmental powers. 70 Scholars and jurists have advanced several
theories explaining how the Court chooses one of these methodologies
over the other.71 Justice Kennedy suggested one such framework in
65. The requirements for the appointment of inferior officers were apparently relaxed out
of a concern for efficiency. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1878). Congress,
however, has no role to play in the appointment of inferior officers. They can be appointed
either in the same manner as principal officers, by the President alone, by the heads of
departments, or by the courts of law. This may be one reason that removal cases have
consistently denied any congressional role in the removal of executive officers.
66. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 187-89 (Souter, J., concurring).
67. The President's appointment power is in no way diminished by the "cause"
requirement for removal of the heads of independent agencies. Despite the diminution of the
President's removal power in regard to these agency heads, the Court has been explicit in its
preservation of the President's power to appoint. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 619.
68. Entin, 51 Ohio St. L. J. at 176 (cited in note 40).
69. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. at 136-43 (stating that members of a governmental
body not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause may not exercise traditionally
executive functions); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-57 (using a formalist approach to separation of
powers in striking down a legislative veto provision); Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority v. Noise Abatement Citizens, 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (striking down a provision granting a
Board composed of members of Congress a veto power over decisions made by the Airport
Authority); Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 36 F.3d 97, 105 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (striking down an amended version of the above Board); Federal Election Comnn'n v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding the presence of the Secretary of
the Senate and the Clerk of the House on the Federal Elections Commission unconstitutional);
Bowvsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986) (striking down a statute that vested executive
powers in a "legislative actor").
70. See, for example, Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 631 (using a functionalist
approach to uphold a for-cause removal provision); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
418 U.S. 683 (1974) (allowing a subpoena requiring the President to testify).
71. See Public Citizen v. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 484-85 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the Court chooses either a formal or functional approach to
separation of powers cases depending upon whether the power in question is textually commit-
ted); Rosenberg, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 685 (cited in note 5) (adopting this theory). But see
Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions-A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 489 (1987) (stating that the Court has utilized
both the functional and formal approaches inconsistently in deciding cases); Cass R. Sunstein,
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Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,72 explaining that the Court
employs a more functionalist, balancing approach to separation of
powers cases when the governmental power in question is not textu-
ally committed to any one branch.73 In such cases, the Court will
balance the intrusion on one branch's powers against the need to
promote a governmental objective.74 In cases where the disputed
power is textually committed, it is thought that the Framers have
already gone through the balancing process. Thus it is not the pre-
rogative of the Court to change this allocation of power. In Justice
Kennedy's mind, the President's appointment power is textually
committed and thus inviolate.75
Under this theory, any examination of an appointments clause
problem would call for a formalist approach and therefore consist
solely of a determination as to whether the act in question violates the
text of the Appointments Clause.76 Court appointment of an agency
head might prove unconstitutional under such a textual analysis.
Under the Appointments Clause, a court has no authority to appoint
an officer of the United States who is not considered inferior. Such
power lies solely in the hands of the President. 77 An independent
agency head will likely be considered a principal officer by the court 78
and therefore can be appointed only by the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Thus a court appointment of an agency
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 492-500 (1987) (attributing the
fluctuation between formal and functional approaches to the evaluation of independent
agencies, at least in part, to a move away from the New Deal concepts of constitutionalism).
72. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
73. Id. at 484-85 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Rosenberg, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at
685 (cited in note 5) (stating that courts will evaluate an alleged violation of separation of
powers using a two-part balancing test in the absence of a specific textual commitment).
Although Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714, and Myers, 272 U.S. at 52, may seem to contradict this
theory, under close examination they do not. The Court, in both cases, seemed to adopt a
formalist approach, yet neither of the powers in question was textually committed. The Court
may, however, have been applying a functional analysis in these cases and merely decided that
the risks outweighed the benefits of the law. In a functionalist approach, the risks of
aggrandizement and encroachment are weighed against the need for the law. In both Bowsher
and Myers, Congress had reserved power for itself. This is a clear case of encroachment.
Functionalism is a balancing approach, and the Court seems to have drawn the line such that it
precludes Congress from playing any role in the removal process.
74. An example of this approach can be seen in the removal cases, specifically in Morrison,
487 U.S. at 691-92 (deciding that restrictions on the President's ability to remove the
Independent Counsel did not unduly interfere with the President's duties, and that there was a
strong need for an independent investigation of executive officers). This is logical because the
power to remove, other than by impeachment, is not discussed in the Constitution.
75. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 484-85 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 487-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132.
78. For a discussion of the status of an agency head as a principal officer see Parts IVA2-3.
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head would be unconstitutional. This section argues that a court-
ordered reinstatement of an agency head has the same practical, if
not constitutional, effect as a court appointment. By reinstating an
agency head, therefore, a court would in effect be appointing an officer
who, according to the Constitution, can only be selected by the
President.
1. Reinstatement as an Appointment
In order for the Appointments Clause to apply to a court-or-
dered reinstatement, a reinstatement must be deemed similar enough
to an appointment to fall within the strictures of this constitutional
provision. Although the relatedness of these terms has never been
squarely addressed, the two actions are by nature similar.
Reinstatement involves inserting individuals into jobs from which
they have been discharged.7 9 Reinstatement strives to place such
individuals in the positions they would have been in but for unlawful
termination.80 In essence, though, the court is ordering the employer
to choose the plaintiff rather than someone else to fill a vacant posi-
tion. A court ordering reinstatement effectively chooses which indi-
vidual will become an agency head.8' Logically, therefore, a court-
ordered reinstatement would constitute an appointment for the pur-
poses of constitutional analysis.
One may draw the same conclusion from the language used by
courts in describing the two actions. In Collins v. United States,82 an
Army officer challenged the manner of his discharge from the service.
In response to this challenge, Congress authorized the President to
reappoint Collins and to retire him at the proper pay for an officer of
his rank. The Treasury Department then refused to pay Collins. The
department considered his reappointment invalid because the
President had authorized it without the advice and consent of the
Senate. Although the court upheld the reinstatement, it did so under
the reasoning that Army officers are properly classified as inferior
officers under the Appointments Clause and consequently may be
appointed by the President alone.83 The court thereby applied an
79. Black's Law Dictionary 1287 (West, 6th ed. 1991).
80. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 799 n.41 (1976).
81. Black's Law Dictionary defines appointment for an office or public function as "[t]he
selection or designation of a person.., to fill an office or public function and discharge the
duties of the same." Black's Law Dictionary at 99 (cited in note 79). Thus, the power to appoint
necessarily includes the power to choose.
82. 14 Ct. Cl. 568 (1878).
83. Id. at 574.
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appointments clause analysis to the reinstatement of an executive
officer.8 4 It must therefore have considered the reinstatement equiva-
lent to an appointment for the purposes of constitutional analysis85
One may draw a similar inference from Steffan v. Perry.s6 In
Steffan, a midshipman from the Naval Academy was discharged from
the Academy after admitting his homosexuality. Graduates of the
Naval Academy are typically commissioned as officers in the Navy
immediately following graduation. All naval officers are to be ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Thus, the
Secretary of the Navy argued that a court-ordered reinstatement to,
and graduation from, the Academy would constitute an appointment
in violation of the Appointments Clause.87
The issue of reinstatement was not addressed by the majority
of the court because Steffan's discharge was upheld. Judge Wald's
dissent, however, did raise the issue.88 Because the only relief avail-
able to the court would have been an order of re-enrollment and
graduation-not an order of appointment-and because the President
had not yet refused to appoint Steffan, Judge Wald found an ap-
pointments clause challenge to be premature.8 9  In coming to this
conclusion, however, Judge Wald at least preliminarily must have
subjected reinstatement to an appointments clause analysis. Judge
Wald must therefore have reached the conclusion that reinstatement
constituted an appointment for constitutional purposes.
Additionally, the fact that an award of reinstatement is subject
to the discretion of the court in both Title VII and Civil Service cases 9
84. Id. at 575.
85. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See Parks v. Brennan, 389 F. Supp.
790, 793 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (equating reinstatement and appointment when discussing the ade-
quacy of remedies for a federal employee in a Title VII case); Eberlein v. United States, 53 Ct.
Cl. 466, 472 (1918) (equating reinstatement and appointment when discussing who had the
authority to reinstate a customs employee); Madigan v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 641, 642-43
(1958) (referring to a reinstatement as an appointment).
In addition, the National Labor Relations Act has been read to include a requirement to hire
a victim of discrimination, despite the fact that the statute only speaks to "reinstatement." See
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941) (stating that requiring the rehiring
of a victim of discrimination furthers the priniciples of the Act). If hiring and reinstatement are
considered equivalent under this statute, it is logical to equate appointment and reinstatement.
86. 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
87. Id. at 720-21 n.27 (Wald, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id. Even had the issue been reached, the Secretary's argument would likely have
failed. Naval officers are considered inferior officers under the Appointments Clause, see
Collins v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 568, 576 (1879), and thus can be appointed by the court.
90. See Part VI; Castle v. Bentsen, 872 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (D.D.C. 1995) (stating that
under Title VII, the judiciary has the discretion to grant the equitable relief that it deems to be
appropriate); Mitchum v. Hurt, 73 F.3d 30, 35 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that equitable relief should
be available to government employees whose first amendment rights have been violated); Bullo
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implies that the initial discharge has been given effect by the court
and that reinstatement is in fact a rehiring or a reappointment. If
reinstatement were merely the determination of a continuing right to
the position in question, it would logically be mandated upon a finding
of wrongful discharge rather than being dependent on the discretion
of the court. By allowing individual judges to weigh the effects of an
order of reinstatement and to determine whether such an award
would be equitable, the law impliedly gives effect to the initial dis-
charge.91
In summary, because any order of reinstatement mandates
that the employer choose the discharged employee instead of anyone
else, reinstatement has all the essential characteristics of a court
appointment. At the very least, a court order of reinstatement would
give the impression of usurping presidential power and create tension
between the executive and the judiciary. The reinstated agency head
would be sitting with only the approval of the court-not that of the
President. Hence, for purposes of constitutional analysis, a rein-
statement should be treated as an appointment and should be subject
to the strictures of the Appointments Clause.
2. An Independent Agency Head as an Officer of the United States
The first question to ask in applying the Appointments Clause
in this context is whether the agency head is indeed an officer of the
United States. If so, the agency head must be appointed under the
terms of the Clause. The Court most recently defined the characteris-
tics of an officer of the United States in Buckley v. Valeo.92  In
Buckley, the court examined the constitutionality of the appointment
of members to the Federal Election Commission. As a part of its
appointments clause analysis, the Court held that "any appointee
v. City of Fife, 50 Wash. App. 602, 749 P.2d 749, 753 (1988) (noting that the trial court had the
authority to reinstate a government worker if proper proceedings by the state would have
prevented her discharge).
91. But see West v. Board of County Commissioners, Monroe County, 373 So.2d 83, 87
(Fla. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a discharged employee who has later been reinstated should
be regarded as having been continuously employed from the time of his supposed discharge to
his judicially compelled reinstatement).
92. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See also Germaine, 99 U.S. at 512 (holding a surgeon retained on
an intermittent basis not to be an officer of the United States); Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S.
310, 327 (1890) (holding a merchant appraiser not to be an officer of the United States); United
States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 531 (1888) (holding a customs clerk not to be an officer of the
United States).
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exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States is an 'Officer of the United States.' ),93
Applying this definition to independent agency heads, it must
first be noted that agency heads are often granted powers to investi-
gate, prosecute, and enact rules, all pursuant to enabling statutes,
which are "laws of the United States."94 In addition, such agency
heads are free to pursue any matters that fall within the confines of
their enabling statutes.95 Possessing these powers gives independent
agency heads "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States" and thereby places them within the Buckley definition
of an officer of the United States. Consequently, independent agency
heads must be appointed by the procedures delineated in the
Appointments Clause. This does not, however, answer the question
as to whether courts have the authority to appoint such agency heads.
3. An Independent Agency Head as a Principal Officer
The Appointments Clause grants Congress the authority to
vest the appointment of "such inferior officers, as they think proper,
in the ... Courts of Law."96 This language effectively divides all ex-
ecutive officers into two classes. 97 Principal officers may be appointed
only by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Inferior officers, on the other hand, may be appointed in any of four
ways: by the President with advice and consent, by the President
alone, by the heads of departments, or by the courts of law.98
Therefore court appointment of an agency head is constitutional only
if the agency head is considered an inferior officer.9 9 If the heads of
independent agencies are considered principal officers under the
Appointments Clause they may be appointed only by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.1 °
93. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
94. Enabling statutes for independent agencies are enacted pursuant to Article I, § 8 of
the United States Constitution and are thus proper laws of the United States.
95. Donald J. Simon, The Constitutionality of the Special Prosecutor Law, 16 U. Mich. J.
L. Ref. 45, 60-61 (1982) ("[Heads] of a department... [are] free to pursue any matter within the
broad confines of executive power.").
96. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
97. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 509.
98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132.
99. Such an appointment may still be unconstitutional as an interbranch appointment.
See Part IV.B.1.
100. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-71.
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As the Court has noted, "[t]he line between 'inferior' and
'principal' officers is one that is far from clear."'' 1 Even so, the Court
provided some guidance in Morrison v. Olson. In that case, the Court
did not draw a clear distinction between the two types of officers
because it found the Independent Counsel obviously to be an inferior
officer. 02 The Court did, however, enumerate four factors which led to
this determination, and these factors can be used as a guide in deter-
mining whether an agency head is a principal or an inferior officer.103
Alternatively, scholars have suggested that principal officers
are limited to those actually listed in the Appointments Clause. Any
officer not named in this clause is thereby considered inferior.10 4
Under either approach, the head of an independent agency can be
considered a principal officer. Thus court appointment, and arguably
reinstatement, would be unconstitutional.
a. The Morrison Factors
The Court in Morrison looked to four factors in its determina-
tion that the Independent Counsel was an inferior officer: tenure,
jurisdiction, removal, and duties.10 5 An examination of these factors
may shed light on the question of whether agency heads are principal
or inferior officers.106
The Morrison Court explained that the office of Independent
Counsel, although not subject to a time limit, ended with the accom-
plishment of a single task and was thus an office of limited tenure. 0 7
This served as evidence that the Independent Counsel was an inferior
officer. In contrast, the tenure of an independent agency head is not
limited in the same sense. Although each individual commissioner
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. For a discussion of these factors, see Part IV.A.3.a.
104. Tachmes, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. at 748 (cited in note 64); Simon, 16 U. Mich. J. L. Ref.
at 60 (cited in note 95).
105. 487 U.S. at 671-72. The Court developed this approach in conjunction with its past
cases on the issue. Id. at 672-73. See United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343-44 (1898)
(finding a "vice-consul" in the State Department to be a subordinate officer); Ex Parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 398 (1880) (finding "supervisors of elections" to be inferior officers); Go-Bart
Importing v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1931) (finding United States Commissioners,
who performed various judicial and prosecutorial powers, to be inferior officers); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694, 696 (1974) (referring to the Special Prosecutor as a subordinate
officer).
106. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 192 (Souter, J., concurring) (applying the Morrison factors to the
argument that military judges are principal officers).
107. 487 U.S. at 672.
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serves for a limited time period, 108 the office of an independent agency
head continues beyond the service of any one commissioner. In this
sense, the office is no more temporary than that of President.
The Court in Morrison also looked to the fact that an inde-
pendent counsel was limited in his or her jurisdiction.19 The
Independent Counsel Act itself was limited in applicability to certain
federal officers suspected of specified crimes. In addition, the
Independent Counsel's investigation was limited in its jurisdiction to
the scope defined by the Special Division.110 In contrast, the jurisdic-
tion of an independent agency is limited only by the scope of its ena-
bling act, and these grants of power are notoriously broad., An
agency with prosecutorial powers typically has jurisdiction over any
violation of its enabling act, regardless of the perpetrator, and those
agencies with rulemaking authority enact rules that apply equally to
everyone in the country. In addition, many independent agencies are
given both rulemaking and prosecutorial power. Thus, the jurisdic-
tion of an agency head is not limited in the sense discussed by the
Court in Morrison.
The Morrison Court also considered the manner in which an
Independent Counsel was removed.112 Because the Independent
Counsel was removable for cause by a higher executive branch official
(the Attorney General), the Court inferred that he or she was an
inferior officer.113 No such removal provision exists for independent
agency heads. They are subject to removal only by the President, and
for-cause limits on this removal power do not diminish these commis-
sioners' status as principal officers. 114
The final factor to which the Morrison Court looked in deter-
mining the status of the Independent Counsel under the
Appointments Clause was the limited nature of his or her duties.115
The Court pointed to the fact that the Independent Counsel had no
108. Commissioners usually serve terms of four to seven years. For example, members of
the NCUA Board serve six-year terms. 12 U.S.C. § 1752a (1994 ed.). Board members of the
FDIC serve six-year terms. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994 ed.). Members of the FTC serve seven-year
terms. 28 U.S.C. § 288 (1994 ed.).
109. 487 U.S. at 672.
110. Id.
111. See Simon, 16 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 60-61 (cited in note 95) (distinguishing the special
prosecutor from the head of a department because the head of a department "is free to pursue
any matter within the broad confines of executive power").
112. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 663, 671.
113. Id. at 671.
114. The debate as to whether Congress could limit removal power demonstrates the
prominence of these officials in the government.
115. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72.
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authority to make policy decisions or to perform any administrative
duties outside those necessary to run his or her office. 116 The head of
an independent agency, on the other hand, does make policy decisions
and does perform many administrative duties.11
Thus, under the Morrison factors, it is clear that the head of an
independent agency is a principal officer for the purposes of the
Appointments Clause.
b. Enumeration in the Appointments Clause
The conclusion that the head of an independent agency is a
principal officer is also supported by the theory that any officer of the
United States who is not otherwise mentioned in the Appointments
Clause is an inferior officer.11 Under this theory, only officers specifi-
cally listed in the Appointments Clause are considered principal
officers.
Among others, "Heads of Departments" are listed in the
Clause."1 Thus, if independent agency heads are considered heads of
departments, they should be treated as principal officers for the
purposes of the Appointments Clause. 20 Although some have argued
that for the purposes of the Appointments Clause, only cabinet level
officials should be considered heads of departments,121 arguments for
the inclusion of the heads of independent regulatory commissions are
strong. Most convincing, perhaps, is Justice Antonin Scalia's argu-
ment in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.22 Justice
Scalia points out that Congress has not only historically conferred
116. Id.
117. Peter L. Strauss, Administrative Law 35-36 (Foundation Press, 1995).
118. See Simon, 16 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 61-62 (cited in note 95) (explaining that the
special prosecutor is an inferior officer because his or her position is not enumerated in the
Appointments Clause); Tachmes, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. at 747-48 (cited in note 64) (stating that
all officers whose appointments are not provided for by the Appointments Clause are to be
considered inferior officers). See also Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511 (referring to inferior officers as
those subordinate to officers already mentioned in the Appointments Clause); Collins, 14 Ct. Cl.
at 574 (referring to inferior officers as any officers inferior to the courts of law or the heads of
departments).
119. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Officers mentioned in the clause include ambassadors,
public ministers, consuls and judges of the Supreme Court, all of whom must be appointed by
the President. The clause also includes the President, courts of law, and heads of departments,
all of whom have the authority to appoint inferior officers.
120. Tachmes, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. at 747 (cited in note 64).
121. Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (stating in dicta that the head of a
department must be in charge of a "great division" of government such as the cabinet depart-
ments). But see Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 886 n.4 (1991)
(expressly reserving the question as to whether independent regulatory commissioners qualify
as heads of departments).
122. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 915-22 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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appointment power on non-Cabinet level officials, 123 but also continues
to do so frequently. 124  A determination that independent agency
heads are not the heads of departments would call into question the
constitutionality of all of these appointments. In addition, some have
suggested that in order to determine the status of an officer for the
purposes of the Appointments Clause one should look to congressional
intent. 25 The conferral of appointment power referred to by Justice
Scalia shows clear congressional intent to include independent agency
heads as heads of departments under the Appointments Clause.
Furthermore, even if agency heads were not considered heads
of departments, they might nonetheless fall within the language
mandating that the President appoint all "public Ministers and
Consuls." Indeed, the language "public Ministers and Consuls" in the
Appointments Clause126 has been read to include the head of a de-
partment or an agency. 127 If this approach were taken, heads of inde-
pendent agencies would be considered principal officers who must be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Any judicial appointment of the head of an independent agency would
therefore violate the Appointments Clause. As shown above, a court
reinstatement would have the same practical effect as a court ap-
pointment. Therefore, it too would arguably violate the Appointments
Clause.
B. Reinstatement as a Functional Violation of
Separation of Powers Principles
As discussed above, 28 courts apply either a formal approach or
a more permissive functional approach to separation of powers ques-
tions. The above analysis illustrates that under a formalist analysis,
court reinstatement of an agency head arguably violates the
Appointments Clause and underlying separation of powers concepts.
This Section argues that even if the Court applied the more liberal
123. In 1792, Congress created the Postmaster General and conferred upon him the power
to appoint subordinate officers. Id. at 917-18.
124. Many heads of regulatory commissions have the authority to appoint subordinates.
Id. at 918 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 155(f) (1994 ed.)) (FCC may appoint a managing director); Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 42 (1994 ed.) (FTC may appoint a secretary); Securities Acts
Amendments of 1990, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b)(1) (1994 ed.) (SEC may appoint such officers as may be
necessary); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4a(c) (1994 ed.) (Commodity Futures Trading
Commission may appoint a general counsel)).
125. Tachmes, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. at 750-52 (cited in note 64).
126. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
127. Simon, 16 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 60 n.96 (cited in note 95).
128. See notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
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balancing approach to this issue, court appointment of an independ-
ent agency head would violate the separation of powers doctrine. In
applying a functional analysis, courts have focused on the existence of
checks and balances, asking whether one branch has encroached on
the powers of another branch.129
1. Reinstatement as an Unconstitutional Interbranch Appointment
The appointment by one branch of government of an officer of
another branch has been challenged as violating the separation of
powers doctrine. 130 Although cases have interpreted the Constitution
to allow some interbranch appointments, 131 the Court in Morrison
spoke of a constitutional limitation on interbranch appointments that
are "incongruous" with the functions of the appointing branch. 32
Under this analysis, the appointment of an officer-such as an agency
head-charged with making political decisions appears incongruous
with the independent, nonpolitical nature of a court. In fact, the
Morrison Court used court appointment of an agency head as an ex-
ample of an incongruous interbranch appointment.133 Thus even if a
court reinstatement of an independent agency head were not consid-
ered a violation of the Appointments Clause, it might still be consid-
ered an unconstitutional interbranch appointment.
2. Interference with the President's Duties
Even if court reinstatement of an agency head did not techni-
cally qualify as an interbranch appointment, it might nonetheless fail
functional separation of powers analysis as an unconstitutional court
interference with the President's duties. Cases using the functional
approach have looked at whether an intrusion into the President's
129. Entin, 51 Ohio St. L. J. at 188 (cited in note 40).
130. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676.
131. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1879) (holding that court appointment of
election supervisors, who are considered executive officials, is constitutional); Rice v. Ames, 180
U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners of extradition); Hobson v.
Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 902 (D.D.C. 1967) (upholding court appointment of members of the
District of Columbia Board of Education); United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835, 840-43
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (upholding court appointment of temporary United States Attorneys).
132. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677. See also Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883 (1991) (pointing out that
the appointments clause issues in that case would be different if it were an interbranch ap-
pointment).
133. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676 n.13 ("This is not a case in which judges are given power to
appoint an officer in an area in which they have no special knowledge or expertise, as in, for
example, a statute authorizing the courts to appoint officials in the Department of Agriculture
or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.").
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power prevents him from "accomplishing his constitutionally assigned
functions" and whether the intrusion is justified by the need for the
provision in question. 34 The Court set the standard by which it typi-
cally measures the constitutionality of encroachment upon executive
functions in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.'13 In Nixon,
the Court set out a two part analysis. 36 First, a court must determine
whether the action in question threatens to prevent another branch
from accomplishing its constitutional functions. 137  If so, the court
must ask if this potential for disruption is justified by an overriding
need to promote objectives within the constitutional powers of the
acting branch.3 8
Applying the first prong of that analysis, court appointment of
an agency head poses a clear danger of limiting the President's ability
to perform his constitutional functions. At issue is the President's
duty to "take Care that the Laws are faithfully executed." 39 In this
day of extensive reliance on administrative agencies, independent
agency heads are often instrumental in making and implementing
law and policy in key areas of national concern. In such areas, the
President, as the head of the government, arguably needs the ability
to act quickly.14 In addition, the President serves an important role
as the one central influence among all administrative agencies, many
of which have overlapping spheres of activity. Virtually every inde-
pendent agency operates within a sphere that not only intersects with
executive policies, but also overlaps with the jurisdiction of executive
134. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 484 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 443).
135. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
136. Id. at 443.
137. Id.
138. Id. See also the discussion of Nixon in Rosenberg, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 638 (cited
in note 5).
139. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3.
140. This approach is premised on a theory of a unitary executive. Under such a theory,
the President, as the head of government, "should be able to determine policy for the adminis-
trative agencies and should have the authority to dictate agency action-subject, of course, to
the limits imposed by the Constitution and to the limits on substantive action contained in the
authorizing legislation." Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unified Executive in a Unified Theory of
Constitutional Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 201, 205 (1993). This
theory has been advanced by many scholars as the proper role of the President within the
Executive Branch. See generally Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1155 (1992); Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23 (1995);
David B. Riuken, The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch
Rulemaking, 7 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 309 (1993). Other scholars, however, argue that Congress
should be able to limit the President's actions in this respect. See generally Thomas 0.
McGanity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443
(1987); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984).
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agencies. For example, the banking industry is concurrently
regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency ("OCC"), the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"), the Federal Reserve Board, and the National
Credit Union Administration ("NCUA"). 141 Although some of these
agencies are independent, 42 others are pure executive agencies, ulti-
mately responsible to cabinet level officials. 43 Effective presidential
implementation of any policy in the banking industry therefore de-
pends on the President's ability to resolve conflicts and to encourage
cooperation among the various regulating bodies. 44 It is thus crucial
to the President's duty under the Take Care Clause to have some form
of working relationship with these agency heads.' 45 Such a relation-
ship would not be possible if the official were reinstated by a court
over presidential opposition.
This disruption of presidential function is not outweighed by
independent agencies' need for independence." 6 As further discussed
below, 47 these agencies are no longer mainly quasi-judicial in nature,
and their growing authority suggests a need for accountability. Thus,
it is likely that judicial reinstatement of such an agency head would
violate the doctrine of separation of powers under a functional analy-
sis as well.
141. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1828 (1994 ed.) (creating and enumerating the powers of the FDIC);
12 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1994 ed.) (creating and enumerating the powers of the 0CC); 12 U.S.C. §§
1462(a), 1464 (1994 ed.) (establishing the OTS and enumerating its powers); 12 U.S.C. § 248
(1994 ed.) (describing the powers of the Federal Reserve Board); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1766 (1994
ed.) (establishing and enumerating the powers of the NCUA).
142. 12 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (establishing the NCUA as an "independent agency within the
executive branch"); 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (creating the FDIC with a multimember board and stating
that no more than three of the five board members may be of the same political party); 12
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (establishing the Federal Reserve Board as an independent agency).
143. 12 U.S.C. § 1 (establishing the OCC within the Department of the Treasury); 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1462(a), 1464 (establishing the OTS within the Department of the Treasury and subjecting
its Director to the general supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury).
144. See Sunstein, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 450-51 (cited in note 71) ("[W]ithout unitary
control, it is difficult to coordinate agency decisions or to redirect national policy."); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667-72 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (describing
the President's role as the only national official charged with coordinating a mass of legislation).
145. This same argument could be used to challenge the constitutionality of for-cause
provisions themselves. The threat to policy coordination is not as great, however, in the initial
appointment stage because the President has specifically chosen the agency head as someone
with whom he or she can work. By removing that official the President is effectively stating an
inability to continue this working relationship, and therefore there is a greater threat to the
President's power if an agency head were reinstated.
146. Even if the disruption of presidential function is not thought to be so severe as to rise
to the level of a functional violation of the separation of powers principle, it might weigh heavily
in a judge's discretionary decision as to whether to grant the equitable remedy of reinstatement.
For a discussion of these concerns, see Part VI.A.
147. See notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
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V. OTHER BARRIERS TO REINSTATEMENT
Separation of powers principles present two further difficulties
in reinstating a discharged agency head. Both the doctrine of presi-
dential immunity from injunction and that of justiciability are efforts
by courts to function within constitutional limits. Presidential im-
munity is grounded in the notion that a court should not extend its
authority to the questioning of the President's conduct while in of-
fice. 148 Similarly, courts find cases non-justiciable when they consider
the actions in question to be within the province of another branch of
government. An examination of both of these doctrines produces
several constitutional arguments against court-ordered reinstatement
of a discharged agency head.
A. Presidential Immunity
Presidential immunity forms perhaps the most significant hur-
dle to the reinstatement of a discharged agency head. Reinstatement
is a form of injunction, 4 9 and in general, courts do not have jurisdic-
tion to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. 50
Under federal law, a writ of mandamus is the vehicle through
which the President would be compelled to reinstate a discharged
agency head.151 Mandamus is considered an extraordinary remedy,
however, and it is only issued in very limited circumstances. 52 It is
well settled that courts can issue writs of mandamus against most
executive officers only to compel the performance of purely
"ministerial" duties-not to mandate the performance of discretionary
duties.153 Even for performance of ministerial duties, however, the
148. Laura Krugman Ray, From Prerogative to Accountability & the Amenability of the
President to Suit, 80 Ky. L. J. 739, 757 (1992); Cobegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946)
C'The duty to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed cannot be brought under legal
compulsion.").
149. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.9 at 163 (cited in note 13).
150. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) 475, 501 (1866).
151. A writ of mandamus is by definition an extraordinary writ issued by a court command-
ing an executive, administrative, or judicial officer to perform a ministerial act clearly owed the
complainant under law. Black's Law Dictionary at 961 (cited in note 79). 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1994 ed.) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over any action of mandamus to
compel an officer, employee, or agency of the United States government to perform a duty owed
to the plaintiff. See Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930).
152. Craig, 1 Civil Actions Against the United States § 1.13 at 34 (cited in note 46);
Whitehouse v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 349 U.S. 366, 373 (1955).
153. Ganein v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 844, 852-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (issuing a writ of mandamus
against the Secretary of Health and Human Services for the administration of the Social
Security Act); Haneke v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 535 F.2d 1291, 1296 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (issuing a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
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Supreme Court has reserved the question of whether a court could
enjoin the President himself.154 The Court apparently based the dis-
tinction between the President and other executive officers on separa-
tion of powers principles, reasoning that lawsuits against other execu-
tive officers do not raise separation of powers questions as significant
as those posed by suits against the President.155 Courts are concerned
not only that deference to the President is necessary to ensure the
effective performance of presidential duties,56 but also that it is not
the place of a court to question the official actions of the President.157
These separation of powers concerns would arguably preclude a court
from issuing a writ of mandamus ordering the President to reinstate
an improperly removed agency head.
Even if a court did allow mandamus against the President to
perform a ministerial duty, these same separation of powers concerns
would prevent an injunction against any executive officer-including
the President-for the performance of a discretionary act.
A ministerial duty is one "in respect to which nothing is left to
discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions
admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law."' 58 Courts use three
criteria in determining whether a duty is ministerial: (1) the claim
must be clear and certain; (2) the duty of the officer must be plain,
clearly defined and obviously owed to the plaintiff; and (3) the plain-
tiff must lack an adequate remedy other than mandamus.159 The bur-
for the classification of the plaintiffs wage under the Civil Service laws); Wilbur, 281 U.S. at
218-19 (stating that a writ of mandamus can be had against an executive officer to perform a
ministerial duty).
154. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802 (1992); Johnson, 71 U.S. at 498-99.
155. Despite the Supreme Court's reservation of this question, several lower court decisions
have allowed mandamus against the President for ministerial duties. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 826
(Scalia, J., concurring); Berry v. Reagan, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 33,898 (D.D.C. 1983)
(enjoining the removal of Civil Rights Commissioners), vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir.
1983); National Wildlife Federation v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating
that the court's power to issue a writ of mandamus for an executive officer to perform a
ministerial duty is not altered if the officer is the President); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 602-03 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that mandamus can be issued
against the President for the performance of ministerial duties). See also United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (holding that the President can be compelled to produce
documents in an ongoing criminal investigation); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cases 30, 34
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (finding that a subpoena may be issued for the President in a criminal
investigation).
156. Ray, 80 Ky. L. J. at 780 (cited in note 148).
157. Id. at 757.
158. Johnson, 71 U.S. at 498.
159. Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208, 212 (D.D.C. 1994). See also Craig, 1 Civil
Actions Against the United States § 1.13 at 34 (cited in note 46) (noting the three requirements
for mandamus relief).
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den of proving a task to be ministerial rests on the party seeking
mandamus. 160
The removal of an independent agency head does not meet
these criteria. First, the claim of a discharged agency head is far from
clear and certain because courts have never explicitly determined the
meaning of "for cause."''1 1 Similarly, the President does not have an
obvious duty to reinstate the agency head. A for-cause provision
leaves the President some discretion as to what constitutes cause
sufficient for removal. It therefore gives the agency head no unfet-
tered right to maintain his position. 162 The President's discretion to
determine cause would likely prevent a plaintiff from ever showing
the President's duty to reinstate to be plain, clearly defined, and obvi-
ously owed.
In addition, the availability of a remedy other than reinstate-
ment weighs against the issuance of a writ of mandamus. As dis-
cussed above, money damages would likely be available to the plain-
tiff in such a case. Although these damages may not effectuate the
intentions of Congress, they are adequate to redress the harm done to
an agency head discharged for invalid cause. Thus, all three of the
criteria used to determine if a task is ministerial weigh toward a
determination that the President's reinstatement of an agency head is
a discretionary act. Accordingly, the issuance of mandamus seems
highly unlikely.
The recent case of Swan v. Clinton6 3 demonstrates the above
difficulties. The plaintiff, Mr. Robert Swan, was appointed in 1990 for
a six-year term as a member of the NCUA Board. This agency was
created as an "independent agency" by the Federal Credit Union Act
in 1934, and its Board promulgates rules and regulations in order to
supervise and regulate federal credit unions. 64 When Swan's term
expired in 1996, his successor had yet to be confirmed by the Senate.
As a result, pursuant to statute, Swan continued to serve on the
Board in a holdover capacity. On April 8, 1996, President Clinton
informed Swan that he had decided to terminate his service on the
Board effective the following day. The Senate was adjourned until
160. Haneke, 535 F.2d at 1296 n.15.
161. See note 54.
162. As the Court stated in Wilbur v. United States, 'Mandamus has never been regarded
as the proper writ to control the judgment and discretion of an officer as to the decision of a
matter which the law gave him the power and imposed upon him the duty to decide for himself."
281 U.S. at 220.
163. 932 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal docketed, No. 96-5193 (D.C. Cir. June 25, 1996).
164. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795K (1994 ed.).
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April 15, and on April 12, President Clinton issued a recess appoint-
ment designating Yolanda Wheat to succeed Swan on the Board.
Swan filed an action seeking an injunction ordering President
Clinton to reinstate him in his position on the Board and to enjoin the
President from removing him as a member of the Board. 165 The dis-
trict court found the President's ability to remove Board members to
be discretionary rather than ministerial and thus refused to order
mandamus. 6 6
Notably, Swan's circumstances differ from those of many inde-
pendent agency heads because the Federal Credit Union Act does not
contain an express for-cause removal provision. Despite the express
language of the statute in naming the NCUA an independent agency
and despite the nature of the agency's functions, the court refused to
imply a for-cause provision under Wiener.'67 The court reasoned that
any restriction on presidential authority must be clearly stated,
especially when the federal balance of power is at stake.16s Despite
this distinction from the typical case, however, Swan demonstrates
that the President's relative immunity from mandamus will provide a
substantial hurdle to any discharged agency head seeking reinstate-
ment.169
B. Justiciability
Justiciability poses another constitutional difficulty to an im-
properly discharged commissioner seeking relief. 70 The doctrine of
justiciability dictates that a court should not decide "political ques-
tions" or other issues over which the court has no authority.' 7 A re-
moval by the President under a for-cause provision has never been
challenged, and thus the justiciability of such a question has never
been tested. Challenges to presidential appointments, however, have
been found non-justiciable, and the same reasoning may apply to de-
165. Swan, 932 F. Supp. at 9.
166. Because the court found the duty in question to be discretionary, it refused to
comment on the issue of whether mandamus is available against the President. Id. at 11 n.2.
167. Id. at 12-13.
168. Id.
169. This case is currently on appeal to the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. Swan
v. Clinton, 932 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal docketed, No. 96-5193 (D.C. Cir. June 25, 1996).
170. This would comport with the view of some commentators that the Court should refrain
from speaking on most separation of powers issues. See, for example, Entin, 51 Ohio St. L. J. at
209-22 (cited in note 40) (suggesting that the judicial resolution of separation of powers issues
hinders the ability of Congress and the President to resolve these disputes).
171. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962) (describing the political question doctrine).
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termining the availability of reinstatement after the converse act-a
presidential removal.
In Americans United for the Separation of Church and State v.
Reagan,172 a controversy arose surrounding the appointment of an
ambassador to the Vatican. The plaintiffs contended that the
Establishment Clause precluded the President from appointing an
ambassador to the Vatican and thereby recognizing it as a sovereign
state. 173 The Third Circuit answered this challenge by stating that
only the President had the power to appoint ambassadors. It held
that as appointment and recognition decisions were constitutionally
committed to another branch, their propriety was a non-justiciable
political question. 74
Under this same analysis a court might find reinstatement to
be nonjusticiable because appointments are textually committed to a
branch other than the judiciary. As explained above, the
Appointments Clause clearly states that principal officers of the
United States shall be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 175 If one views reinstatement as a re-appoint-
ment 76 and agency heads as principal officers, 77 the decision to rein-
state is textually committed to a branch other than the judiciary. 178
172. 786 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1986).
173. Id. at 197.
174. Id. at 202. The court relied on the enumeration of the factors relevant to determining
whether an issue is a non-justiciable political question in Baker v. Carr. These factors are: (1) a
textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to another branch of government; (2) a lack of
judicially discoverable or manageable standards for resolving the issue; (3) the impossibility of
deciding the issue without making an initial policy determination; and (4) the impossibility of
the coures resolving the issue without showing disrespect to a coordinate branch. 369 U.S. at
217. The Americans United court found the appointment issue non-justiciable only after it had
already determined that the challenge suffered from serious standing problems. Assuming
arguendo that the plaintiff had established standing to challenge the appointment, the court
addressed the issue of justiciability. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State,
786 F.2d at 208-37.
The Tenth Circuit followed this precedent in Phelps v. Reagan, 812 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir.
1987). The court stated that the power to appoint an ambassador and to recognize a foreign
government was vested in the Executive Branch and thus was not an issue for the court to
decide. Id. at 1294. It is unclear how much these decisions were based upon the President's
power in the foreign affairs field. This distinction, however, does not render the comparison
here untenable. Just as the President's power to appoint ambassadors and recognize foreign
governments is specifically listed, so is his authority to appoint officers of the United States.
175. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a discussion of the problems the Appointments
Clause poses for reinstatements, see Part IV.
176. See Part IV.A.1.
177. See Parts IV.A.2-3.
178. The Myers Court found the power of removal to be a necessary corollary to the power
to appoint. 272 U.S. at 119. Thus removal is textually committed to the President as well.
Although Congress has limited the removal power with a for-cause provision in some cases, the
removal power still lies solely in the executive. It is therefore possible that any judicial review
of a for-cause removal would be found a political question. This is not likely, however, in light of
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Thus, it is possible that a court would find the issue of reinstatement
to be a non-justiciable political question.
VI. EQUITABLE CONCERNS RELEVANT TO THE GRANTING OF
REINSTATEMENT
Should a court find reinstatement constitutional, a discharged
agency head would nevertheless face an additional hurdle arising
from the fact that reinstatement is one form of injunction, and there-
fore subject to the rules governing equitable relief.179 Typically, dis-
cretionary power is given to courts in fashioning equitable re-
lief-although this discretion is limited in certain areas of law, such
as employment discrimination and civil service laws. 180 This discre-
tion presents a substantial barrier to a discharged agency head's
request for reinstatement.
A. Discretion in Employment Discrimination Law and the
Presumption in Favor of Reinstatement
The traditional discretion of courts to deny reinstatement is
the most limited in the arena of employment discrimination law.
Even under these principles, however, it is unlikely that an agency
head would be reinstated after an improper removal. The Supreme
Court has identified two theories under which judges' discretion is
directed in employment discrimination suits. First, relief must be
aimed at making victims of discrimination whole after injuries suf-
the fact that executive removals have been reviewed in Myers, Humphrey's Executor, and
Wiener.
179. Dobbs, 1 Law of Remedies § 2.4(1) at 90 (cited in note 13). This can be seen in most
aspects of employment law. For example, under ERISA, reinstatement is viewed as an
equitable remedy. Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (1980). Similarly,
under Title VII, "Itihe Court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1994 ed.) (emphasis added). Such proceedings are considered equitable. Dobbs, 2 Law of
Remedies § 6.10(7) at 237 (cited in note 13).
180. Courts have specifically employed this discretion in determining whether to issue
mandamus against an executive officer. See National Wildlife Federation v. United States, 626
F.2d 917, 924-27 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (denying mandamus under the court's equitable discretion
despite finding that the duty in question was ministerial). The court stated that serious
questions about standing and justiciability led to its decision to exercise its discretion not to
issue mandamus. Id. at 924-25. See also 13th Regional Corp. v. United States Dept. of the
Interior, 654 F.2d 758, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (exercising the court's discretion to deny
mandamus despite finding that the duty in question was ministerial). Courts weigh the same
equitable considerations before issuing declatory relief.
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fered through employment discrimination. 181 Second, relief must be
fashioned as an attempt to restore victims to the positions they would
have held if not for the unlawful discrimination. 182
Reinstatement is a logical consequence of the application of
these principles. Reinstatement is designed to recreate the employ-
ment relationship that existed before the unlawful discharge183 Thus,
there is a strong presumption in favor of reinstatement in employ-
ment discrimination cases. 184 This presumption may be overcome,
however, by the existence of certain exceptional circumstances. Two
such exceptions are particularly applicable to the case of a discharged
agency head.
Courts do not traditionally grant reinstatement if there is
"animosity or hostility between the parties such that a... productive
working relationship would be impossible. " 85 Hostility sufficient to
overcome the presumptive reinstatement rule can occur in the cir-
cumstance of particularly bitter litigation or when the plaintiff would
be reinstated into a high level, unique, or sensitive position.8 6
Following the discharge of an agency head, enough hostility would
likely be present to preclude reinstatement. The agency head's re-
moval indicates that tensions had risen to such a level that the
President was willing to risk the political damage that could result
from the public discharge of an agency head. If an agency head were
181. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 420-21 (1975). See also Belton, Remedies
in Employment Discrimination Law at 85-87 (cited in note 48) (discussing the impact of
Albemarle on employment discrimination cases).
182. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 n.41 (1976) (stating that
district courts should start at "the presumption of rightful-place seniority relief' and continue
with analysis from that point).
183. Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law at 219 (cited in note 48).
184. See Garza v. Brownsville Indep. School Dist., 700 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1983)
(concluding that under Title VII, reinstatement is to be granted "in all but the unusual cases");
In re Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 630 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that "[o]nce discrimination is found,
reinstatement should be granted absent exceptional circumstances"); Coston v. Plitt Theatres,
831 F.2d 1321, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing McNeil v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 800 F.2d
111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986)) (concluding that under the ADEA, "reinstatement is usually the pre-
ferred remedy"); Nord v. United States Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462, 1473 (11th Cir. 1985)
(asserting that reinstatement is to be granted in all but the most unusual cases). See also
Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law at 222-26 (cited in note 48) (discussing the
presumptive reinstatement rule).
185. Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law at 236 (cited in note 48).
186. Id at 252. Ross v. William Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 680, 682-83 (E.D. Mich.
1988) (denying reinstatement to a surgeon because of the disharmonious relationship between
the parties); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 115-16 (7th Cir. 1990) (remanding
the issue of reinstatement and holding that hostility between the parties is an adequate reason
to deny reinstatement); Coston, 831 F.2d at 1331 (denying reinstatement to a position with
public responsibilities because of the hostility between the parties); Combes v. Griffin Television,
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 846-47 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (denying reinstatement to a television anchor
because of the uniqueness of the position and the hostility between the parties).
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reinstated, disagreement at this high level would destroy any produc-
tive working environment and thereby affect the smooth running of
government. 187
A second, similar exception to the general presumption in favor
of reinstatement is equally applicable to the proposed reinstatement
of an agency head. Regardless of predicted hostility, a court's willing-
ness to grant reinstatement often depends on the level of the position
in which the plaintiff seeks to be reinstated.188 In the case of business
executives, courts regularly deny reinstatement. 189 Reinstatement of
a policymaking employee is thought to destroy the harmonious
working relationship necessary for the defendant's business because a
high level employee is likely to be in a position of discretion, for which
he or she must be trusted by the employer.190 The same approach
applies to professional employees. Courts often deny reinstatement to
professionals because their duties include client or public contact in
which they are asked to act as representatives of their employers.
Courts predict that suspicion and conflicts between the plaintiff and
others will undercut the working relationship and lower the quality of
services offered to the public.191
These principles render an agency head unlikely to be rein-
stated. A harmonious working relationship between the President
and such an officer and between the discharged officer and other
agency heads 192 is necessary for the efficiency of government. 193 This
is especially true because the independent agencies no longer perform
solely quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions. These agencies
function in essentially the same manner as executive agencies and are
often responsible for making policy decisions that affect large seg-
187. Despite the fact that these agencies are "independent," the President still interacts
frequently with agency heads in order to mediate on matters of executive policy. For that
reason, a productive working relationship is needed. See notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
188. Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law at 260 (cited in note 48)
(discussing the sliding-scale approach to presumptive reinstatement based on the "hierarchy of
jobs").
189. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (denying rein-
statement to a vice president for stores and operation, a divisional merchandise manager, and a
sportswear buyer); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (S.D.N.Y 1983)
(denying reinstatement to the chief labor counsel).
190. Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law at 262 (cited in note 48).
191. Id. at 263 (citing EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F.2d 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (denying an advertising executive reinstatement)); Combes, 421 F. Supp. at 846-47
(denying reinstatement to a television news anchor).
192. As discussed above, independent agency heads are often members of multi-member
commissions and have to work closely with the other commissioners. See note 7.
193. See notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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ments of the population. 194 In addition, independent agency heads'
responsibility for a great deal of public contact makes their positions
unique. They not only represent the President to the public but also
are often responsible for explaining policy decisions to Congress.
Thus, under the exceptions for hostility and level of position in em-
ployment discrimination law, a court would likely deny reinstatement
for independent agency heads.
B. The Improbability of Reinstatement Under Civil Service Laws
Just as employment law generally directs courts to consider
any hostility that may result from a reinstatement, in the specific
area of fashioning relief for discharged civil service employees, courts
weigh the effect of a given type of relief on the workplace. 195 The
Supreme Court's reasoning in Sampson v. Murray96 clearly displays
the nature of this consideration. Sampson involved the discharge of
an employee of the Public Buildings Service of the General Services
Administration. The employee claimed that the agency had not af-
forded her the proper statutory procedure before her removal, and she
sought an injunction staying her removal until her appeal was com-
plete. The Court held that although a federal court may have the
jurisdiction to enter an order staying removal, the use of this author-
ity is subject to judicial discretion. 197 In exercising this discretion, a
court "is bound to give serious weight to the obviously disruptive
effect" such a stay would have on the administrative process, 98 and to
the traditional rule that the government should be given wide latitude
in conducting its own affairs. 199
As discussed previously, reinstating an agency head would
result in a large disruptive effect.200 In addition, if the government is
given wide latitude in governing its internal affairs with respect to a
low level agency employee, as in Sampson, surely such latitude would
be granted in the case of a high-level official with policy-oriented
194. See notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
195. See, for example, Lewis v. Carter, 436 F. Supp. 958, 961-62 (D.D.C. 1977) (denying a
preliminary injunction to a federal employee because the injunction would unduly interfere with
the executive). But see Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978) (refusing
to balance the equities of enforcing an injunction allowed under the Endangered Species Act).
Hill, however, is distinguishable from the present case because the act in Hill provided no
alternative remedies and specifically called for an injunction. Id. at 168-69.
196. 415 U.S. 61 (1974).
197. Id. at 80.
198. Id. at 83.
199. Id. (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)).
200. See notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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responsibilities. Thus, when an analogy is made to civil service reme-
dies, an agency head is likely to be denied reinstatement.
Despite the above militating factors, Professor Laurence Tribe
has argued that the President could be ordered to reinstate an agency
head subject to a for-cause provision 20 , because courts have ordered
the reinstatement of federal employees in the past. Professor Tribe's
argument, however, fails to recognize the clear role of these agencies
in the policymaking process and therefore the likelihood that agency
heads will not be reinstated. The cases in which federal employees
have been reinstated in the past have involved low-level employees or
those subject to civil service protection, none of whom was originally
appointed by the President.202 Thus the factors that argue against the
reinstatement of an agency head are not present in such cases.
Rather, the discharged employees in the cases Professor Tribe cites
are not high-ranking officials with discretion in matters of policy or
duties to represent the agency to the public, and their reinstatement
would therefore not implicate the same policy considerations raised by
the reinstatement of an agency head. Thus, under the discretion
given courts under civil service laws, a discharged agency head is
unlikely to be reinstated.
C. Balancing the Equities
Outside the specific spheres of employment discrimination and
civil service laws, courts determine whether to grant equitable relief
by balancing the equities of awarding such relief under the theory
that a remedy more costly than beneficial may not be an efficient way
of redressing the invasion of the plaintiffs rights.23 Considerations
201. Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 250 n.20 (cited in note 57).
202. Specifically, Professor Tribe cites the case of Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
Vitarelli was an Education and Training Specialist in the Education Department which was
within the Department of the Interior. He was a low-level employee who could have been
dismissed by the Secretary. Id. at 539. The Court reinstated Vitarelli only because the
Secretary of the Interior had purported to discharge him for security reasons without following
the proper procedure for security risk cases. Id. at 539-40. Additionally, the court specifically
limited Vitarelli's reinstatement, noting that he would still be subject to "any lawful exercise of
the Secretary's [unfettered] authority hereafter to dismiss him from employment." Id. at 546.
Another crucial distinction arises from the fact that Vitarelli was likely an inferior officer for
purposes of the Appointments Clause, and thus no constitutional problems would arise from his
reinstatement. In contrast, the reinstatement of an agency head implicates constitutional
concerns. See Part IV.
203. Dobbs, 1 Law of Remedies § 1.9 at 35 (cited in note 13). One traditional area in which
equitable relief is denied is in cases involving employment contracts. This hesitance on the part
of courts stems from a perceived inability to supervise the conduct of parties in a long term
employment relationship, the lack of objective standards by which to measure compliance with
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relevant to this decision include the risk that a court will err in
ordering this coercive relief, the availability of other remedies, the
hardship that an order of injunctive relief would cause the defendant,
and the interests of the public and third parties. 20 4
If there is a high risk that a court will be in error, the court
may decline to offer equitable relief. All forms of equitable relief are
considered coercive, and a court may wish to avoid forcing action upon
the parties if such coercion may be unjustified.205
The coercive nature of equitable relief also discourages courts
from using it if other remedies are available. This coercion may be
especially acute in reinstating an agency head. If an agency head who
was removed for valid cause were reinstated, he or she would not only
be in a policymaking position without presidential approval but might
also be unqualified to make policy decisions. A court will decline to
order the parties to act affirmatively if it feels that the harm can be
adequately redressed by monetary relief. As discussed above, the
consequences of an error in reinstating an agency head may be par-
ticularly grave. In addition, the availability of money damages might
cause a court to decline to reinstate a discharged agency head.206
In addition, as explained above, 207 severe tensions in the every-
day functioning of government could be created by retaining a high-
ranking official whom the President clearly does not care to work with
or trust. This would result in the President's inability to implement
policy effectively. Even if this disruption could not render reinstate-
ment unconstitutional,20s a court might consider the cost these ineffi-
ciencies imposed on the President and the government as a whole and
decide to deny reinstatement.
Finally, a court will weigh the public interest against the pur-
pose behind the statute.2 9 The public interest may include not only
public policy concerns with maintaining at least a semblance of inde-
pendence for some agencies, but also the structural interests of sepa-
the order, and the traditional doctrine of at-will employment. Belton, Remedies in Employment
Discrimination Law § 7.2 at 220-21 (cited in note 48).
204. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.4(5) at 78-85 (cited in note 13).
205. Id. § 2.9.
206. See Part III for a discussion of the availability of money damages.
207. See notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of the argument that reinstatement is a functional violation of the
separation of powers principle, see Part IV.B.
209. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hecht v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944) (stating that judicial discretion "must be exercised in light of the large
objectives of the Act ... [because] the standards of the public interest, not the requirements of
private litigation, measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief in these cases")).
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ration of powers. 210 The strength of the public interest can be seen in
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo.211 In Weinberger, citizens sought to
enjoin the Navy from continuing air-to-ground weapons training near
Puerto Rico. This training led to occasional discharge of ordnance
into the water, allegedly violating the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. The Court stated that unless Congress specifically de-
lineates a particular form of relief for a statutory violation, the relief
remains subject to the trial court's equitable discretion. 2 2  The
Weinberger Court pointed out that in using this discretion, the trial
court should pay particular attention to the public consequences of
issuing an injunction. 2' 3 Here, the importance of the sight as a train-
ing ground for the military outweighed any interest in enjoining the
Navy's activity.21 4 Like the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, for-
cause removal provisions do not state a particular form of relief.
Thus, as in Weinberger, the court will weigh the public interest in its
consideration of the reinstatement of a discharged agency head.
Substantial public interest arguments favor denying reinstat-
ement. Chief among these is the public interest in maintaining the
separation of powers. The court in National Wildlife Federation v.
United States25 was asked to decide whether to issue mandamus
against the President to provide certain explanations of his 1979
budget in light of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act. The public interest weighed heavily in that decision.
The court refused to issue mandamus because it felt that to do so
would "intrude on the responsibilities ... of the coordinate
branches."21 6  Similarly, the court in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Nixon217 declined to issue mandamus against the President
in order to "show the utmost respect to the office of the Presidency
and to avoid, if at all possible .... any clash between the judicial and
210. Dobbs, 1 Law of Remedies § 2.10 at 178 (cited in note 13). Belton, Remedies in
Employment Discrimination Law at 4(1) (cited in note 48); City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey
Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1993) (explaining that a court will balance the public interest
in deciding whether or not to award equitable relief); Loina Portal Civic Club v. American
Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 556 (1964) (awarding money damages instead of
equitable relief because the public interest weighed in that direction).
211. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
212. Id. at 322 (citing United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 54-59
(1959)).
213. Id. at 312. But see id. at 327-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is a public
interest in upholding the statute by quickly ending any violations).
214. Id. at 310. It is important to note that other nonequitable remedies were available
under the statute and that no appreciable harm to the quality of the water had been found.
215. 626 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
216. Id. at 924.
217. 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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executive branches of the Government."218 These concerns apply
equally to the reinstatement of an independent agency head. By or-
dering such a reinstatement, the court would enter a realm constitu-
tionally reserved to the President. Thus, the same separation of pow-
ers concerns which may lead a court to hold the President immune
from injunction will be considered again in the court's weighing of the
public interest. Even if these concerns do not lead a court to go so far
as to find the President immune, they may cause the court to exercise
its discretion and deny equitable relief.
One could argue, however, that the public interest argument
leads to the opposite conclusion. This argument emphasizes the pub-
lic interest in maintaining the independence of certain agencies from
presidential control. Professor Tribe focuses on this independence,
contending that the usual hesitancy of courts to order specific en-
forcement of employment contracts 219 is irrelevant in the case of an
independent agency head because of such agency's independence from
the executive. 220 Professor Tribe argues that because an agency head
cannot be removed at will by the President, he or she is essentially
independent from presidential control. Consequently, Professor Tribe
hypothesizes, the normal tension between employer and employee
which causes courts to hesitate to reinstate would not be present.221
Reinstatement would therefore not pose any risk of hardship to the
President.
Professor Tribe's contention, however, does not hold true in
light of the current functions of independent agencies. This might be
a compelling argument if independent agencies were truly quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative actors, as discussed in Humphrey's
Executor, and therefore did have functions that intersected with those
of the executive. But such is not the position of most current agency
heads. Any distinction between the functions of independent and
executive agencies has largely been eradicated. Independent regula-
tory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission no longer perform largely adju-
dicatory functions.222 Instead, they engage in extensive rulemaking. 23
218. Id. at 616.
219. The presumption in favor of reinstatement discussed above, see Part VI.A, only
applies in cases of employment discrimination, not in employment contract disputes.
220. Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 250 n.20 (cited in note 57).
221. Id.
222. See Verkuil, 80 Colum. L. Rev. at 954 n.70 (1980) (cited in note 10) (noting that the
FTC was granted rulemaking authority in 1975); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding the substantive rulemaking authority of the FTC);
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The executive agencies now often adjudicate claims as well.224 Thus,
the heads of independent agencies play at least as vital a role in the
administration of government policy as do the heads of executive
agencies. 25 It would therefore seem that the public interest in insu-
lating these leaders from presidential control has diminished.
Additionally, in such a role, independent agency heads are
forced to work with the President, even if only indirectly.226 The sort
of disruption of the agency policymaking process that would result
from reinstating an agency head would trigger courts' traditional
hesitance to reinstate. When the problems caused by reinstating such
a high level official-and the resulting inefficiencies-are weighed
against this arguably diminished public interest in independence,
reinstatement may simply be too costly.
In sum, under the more limited discretion in employment dis-
crimination cases, under traditional applications of equitable discre-
tion applied in the Civil Service context, or under a general balancing
of the equities, a request for reinstatement would likely be denied.
Thus, even if reinstatement were found constitutional, justiciable, and
did not violate presidential immunity, a court would likely still deny
it as a remedy for a discharged agency head.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the better part of this century, Congress has battled to
establish the constitutionality of for-cause removal provisions in an
effort to diminish presidential control over certain agencies. Although
the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld for-cause provisions, no
constitutional remedy for an invalid for-cause removal appears to
exist that will effectuate Congress's purpose.
FTC v. American National Cellular, Inc., 810 F.2d 1511, 1514 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding a
prosecutorial function for the FTC).
223. See Peter P. Swire, Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive
Branch, 94 Yale L. J. 1766, 1770 (1985) (The increased and widely accepted use of rulemaking,
with its balancing of political considerations, has deliberately reduced agency insulation from
external political debate.").
224. Sunstein, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 497 n.352 (cited in note 71) ('Both types of [agencies]
undertake the basic tasks of adjudication, rulemaking, and prosecution.").
225. See Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 472 n.198 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ('Executive agencies perform the same adjudicatory and rulemaking functions as do
independent agencies."); Strauss, 84 Colum. L. Rev. at 584-86 (cited in note 54) (discussing the
functional similarities between independent and executive agencies).
226. See notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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Assuming that judicial review is available for such a dismissal,
an award of money damages could likely be made. Despite the com-
pensatory value of such an award, however, money damages do not
ensure the security of an agency head's job, nor do they effectively
deter presidential action. Reinstatement of the discharged officer
would effectuate the congressional purpose of creating agencies inde-
pendent of presidential control. It is possible, however, that reinstat-
ement would violate the Constitution.
Even if a court overcame the constitutional obstacles, it is
quite plausible that the court would refuse to hear a claim for rein-
statement. Even if the claim were heard, it is unlikely that rein-
statement would be awarded. First, the court may not have authority
to issue an injunction against the President. Even if such an injunc-
tion could be issued, under the discretion granted courts in fashioning
equitable remedies, many attributes of the office of agency head would
weigh against reinstatement.
The consequent lack of an effective remedy leaves for-cause
removal provisions unenforceable and therefore impotent as a source
of legal rights for the heads of regulatory agencies. If this conclusion
is accurate, then one begins to wonder what function, if any, for-cause
provisions serve. One possibility is that for-cause provisions serve as
a political disincentive for the President to remove independent
agency heads. These provisions do require that the President publicly
state a reason for such a discharge and thereby call attention to his or
her actions. The effectiveness of this requirement in providing sig-
nificant independence, however, is questionable.
The press and public arguably may demand a reason for the
dismissal of any cabinet official. Indeed, it is possible that the re-
moval of an agency commissioner would receive less public attention
than that of the head of a department. And because of the confusion
over the meaning of "cause," it is unclear whether the reason for the
discharge of an independent agency head must differ at all from the
reason given for the removal of a cabinet member. Consequently, not
only do for-cause provisions fail to provide any legal independence,
they may be ineffective as a source of political independence as well.
If this is the case, where do independent agencies derive inde-
pendence? One possible source of independence is the structure of
many agencies as multi-member commissions, with party limitations
placed on the appointment of commissioners. These party limitations,
however, may suffer from constitutional problems similar to those
posed by for-cause provisions. To the extent that party specifications
limit the President's power to choose principal officers, they may
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impose unconstitutional congressional restrictions on the appoint-
ment process.
In summary, then, we are left wondering whether independent
agencies are independent at all, and, in light of current agency func-
tions, whether they should be.
Tracey A. Hardin*
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